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AN AMERICAN LOOK AT ZAPPERS:
A paper for the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt,
Revisionssicheres System zur Aufzeichnung von Kassenvorgängen und
Messinformationenthe
Richard T. Ainsworth
The U.S. lags behind most other countries in the pursuit of zapper software. Sales
suppression catches the attention of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) only if the
manipulation seriously impacts a taxpayer’s annual income. This is only to be expected.
The federal government secures revenue primarily through an annual income tax. The
U.S. has no broad-based transaction tax, or federal VAT.
State and local governments on the other hand impose a retail sales tax. As a
result, these jurisdictions are far more concerned with accurate sales records. On average
sales taxes represent one-third of state revenue.1
However, the state sale tax system is not uniform. The overall system is
exceedingly fragmented and localized with major variances in rates, tax base, and
sourcing rules. As a result, the states very much “go it alone,” and when it comes to
auditing firms suspected of using zappers, none of the states have the computer forensic
resources needed to properly complete a zapper audit.
It is not surprising then, that there are only three reported cases of zappers in the
U.S.2 The IRS developed each of them. State and local audits followed the federal audit
each time. Importantly, there are no reported cases of audits sequenced in reverse (where
the IRS followed a state audit) and no reported cases of a state or local government
initiating a zapper audit.
The common observation in the U.S. is that enforcement against technologyfacilitated sales suppression has fallen through an intra-jurisdictional crack. Neither
federal nor state auditors systemically target this area. But this is changing, and the
change is coming from the state side.

1

Across the 45 states where the retail sales tax is levied more than $226 billion was collected in 2010. The
retail sales tax is second to the state individual income tax as a revenue source. Mean state reliance was
34.2%. John L. Mikesell, The Disappearing Retail Sales Tax, 63 STATE TAX NOTES 777 (March 5, 2012),
referencing U.S. Bureau of Census, Governments Division, State Tax Collections Summary Report (2010).
2
The three cases are: (1) Stew Leonard’s Dairy in Danbury Connecticut. See: U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard
Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995) (although the tax case was
settled, the details of the fraud are preserved in these federal sentencing appeals - $17 million sales
skimmed over a 10 year period, with sales tax losses of $500,000 and a final determination of $1.4 million);
(2) the LaShish restaurant chain in the Detroit, Michigan. See: Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Eastern
District of Michigan, Superseding Indictment returned Against LaShish Owner (May 30, 2007) (indicating
that $20 million is cash sales were skimmed over a 5 year period); and (3) Theodore R. Kramer who
installed zappers in Detroit, Michigan area strip clubs – although in this instance the tax amounts lost are
not specified. See: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eastern District of Michigan, Michigan Software Salesman Pleads
Guilty to Conspiracy to Defraud the Government (November 17, 2010).
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In recent years, revenue needs have pushed the states to look more closely at sales
tax losses.3 The states have also taken note of successful international enforcement
efforts against sales suppression in VAT regimes, and these developments have pulled
the states to consider enhancing enforcement measures against suppression frauds.
Evidence that the state picture is changing can be gleaned from legislative developments
and changes in audit priorities in roughly half the sales tax states.4
This paper has two main parts.5 First, it summarizes the current state of sales
suppression enforcement in the U.S. Secondly, it reviews the international solutions that
are attracting the most U.S. attention. A conclusion indicates likely directions for U.S.
enforcement.
The Great Recession –
Pushing State Law Changes against Zappers
Georgia is the first state to take action. On May 3, 2011 Georgia enacted H.B.
415, which added code section 16-9-62 to Georgia statutes. This law made it illegal to
willfully and knowingly sell, purchase, install, transfer, or possess any automated sales
suppression device, zapper or phantom-ware in the state.6 Prior to this date only the
actual fraud was penalized; now the technology that facilitates the fraud is subject to
enforcement measures. Before Georgia, no state penalized fraud-facilitating technology.
On March 1, 2012 Utah followed Georgia and passed a nearly identical bill, H.B.
96. On March 10, 2012 West Virginia passed its version of the Georgia law, S.B. 411.8
On March 13, 2012 Maine also passed its version, L.D. 1764.9 As of March 15, 2012 the
legislation in each of these states awaits a governor’s signature.
7

This is just the beginning. Similar bills are pending in six additional states: New
York, Tennessee,11 Michigan,12 Florida,13 Indiana,14 and Oklahoma.15
10

3

During the heart of the Great Recession (2009-2010) budget deficits were rising in the states. In 2009 the
National Conference of State Legislatures projected budget gaps of $84 billion in just 34 states. By 2010
the gap was $143 billion. These projections set off waives of tax increases and spending cuts that were
exceptionally painful. Robert Buschman & David L. Sjoquist, Recent State Legislative Tax Changes in the
Face of Recession, 63 STATE TAX NOTES 623 (February 20, 2012).
4
By the authors count 20 of the 45 states with a retail sales tax are engage either legislatively or through
criminal investigation in the pursuit of zappers. These states have 56.8% of the U.S. population.
5
Because of space constraints, this paper assumes the significance of pursuing zappers. It assumes that
technology-facilitated sales suppression is as prevalent in the U.S. as it is elsewhere. It assumes both an
active infection rate of approximately 50% in the restaurant industry, and an overall tax system
vulnerability rate of 70% for all point of sale (POS) systems in a state. But, as a powerpoint presentation
by the California Investigations Division puts it:
Does California have a problem? We most likely haven’t found it yet.
Zappers and Phantom-ware: Automated Sales Suppression (March 2012) at 6 (on file with author).
6
GA. CODE ANN. §16-9-62(b).
7
H.B. 96, 2012 Gen. Sess. (UTAH 2012)
8
S.B. 411, 80th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (W. VA. 2012)
9
L.D. 1764, 125th Me. Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (ME. 2012 )
10
S.B. 2852 & S.B. 2611 (requiring a study), 2011 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
11
H.B. 2226, 107th Gen. Assem., (TENN. 2011).
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The Oklahoma legislation is particularly Draconian. Where each of the other
states impose a penalty of up to $100,000 and one to five years in jail, Oklahoma adds a
$10,000 administrative penalty and allows the Commissioner to remove the business
license from the offending establishment for up to ten years if a zapper is found.
Oklahoma H.B. 2576 states:
D. In addition to the criminal penalty provided in subsection C of
this section, any person violating subsection B of this section shall be
subject to an administrative fine of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).
Administrative fines collected pursuant to the provisions of this subsection
shall be deposited to the General Revenue Fund.
E. The Tax Commission shall immediately revoke the sales tax
permit of a person who violated subsection B of this section. A person
whose license is so revoked shall not be eligible to receive another sales
tax permit issued pursuant to Section 1364 of Title 68 of the Oklahoma
Statutes for a period of ten (10) years.
New York and Maine have amnesties provisions for merchants who step forward
and voluntarily disclose a zapper. Oklahoma and the seven other states simply penalize immediately, and without hesitation if a zapper is found.
Aside from these legislative efforts, the author is aware of nine more states where
anti-zapper laws are under active consideration, or where the pursuit of zappers has
become a criminal investigation priority of the department of revenue.
Finally, among the most compelling factors pushing the states into action is a
report that New York has conducted four successful sting operations for zappers.
According to the New York Post the Department of Taxation and Finances found that
when they opened up false restaurants and solicited tenders for new electronic cash
registers that “most”16 of the twenty-four ECR/POS system sales representatives who
showed up actively solicited orders for sales suppression software associated with their
machines.17 The ability to digitally skim sales was clearly considered a competitive
selling point.
International Solutions –
Pulling States to Secure POS Systems Against Zappers
State and local governments are in a position to benefit from international efforts
to find a solution to zappers, and they know it. On the technology side, solutions range
12

S.B. 768 & 769, 2011 Leg., 96th Sess. (MICH. 2011).
S.B. 1304, 2012 Leg., Sess. at §6 (FLA. 2012).
14
H.B. 1337, 117th Gen. Assem., Second Reg. Sess. (IND. 2012).
15
H.B. 2576, 2012 Reg. Sess. (OKLA. 2012).
16
In other venues the Department of Taxation and Finances confirmed the NY Post report and indicated
that by the expression “most” the Department meant that approximately 70% to 80% of the salesmen were
offering zappers.
17
John Crudele, Today’s Special: Scam Dodges $400M in Sales Tax, NEW YORK POST (January 24, 2011).
13
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from very cost-effective measures, like the INSIKA-developed smart card (€50),18 to
Quebec’s far more expensive module d’enregistrement des ventes MEV (costing between
C$600 and C$800).19 Blended applications, like BMC Inc.’s Sales Data Controller –
Mobile (SDC-Mob),20 offer the best attributes of both of these solutions, and a bit more
(US$350).21 These technology solutions encrypt data and prevent it from being “zapped
away.”
Non-technology (regulatory) solutions approach the same problem differently.
The Netherlands and Norway establish the government’s right to control POS system
data, and then marshal market forces to preserve it. The assumption in these jurisdictions
is that data security can be made into a competitive factor among cash register system
providers. Costs in this case are indirect and more difficult to measure.
As state and local governments measure the revenue that is being lost to zappers,
these promises of technological and regulatory solutions pull enforcement efforts
forward.
Technology-based solutions. The INSIKA smart card has caught U.S. attention.
It is hard to argue with a €50 solution that offers a high degree of security for ECR/POS
system transactions.22 The smart card achieves economies by taking advantage of native
ECR/POS system capacities.23 For example, sales data is stored in the electronic journal

18

Personal e-mail communication, Dr. Norbert Zisky, Head of INSIKA research (February 19, 2008) (on
file with author).
19
At a conference in Montreal sponsored by Revenue Quebec, The First Conference on Tax Compliance –
The Fight Against Tax Evasion (June 2-4, 2010) the position of Revenue Quebec was that the MEV (also
called in English translation a Sales Recording Module, or SRM) would cost C$600. On January 26, 2011,
Allagma Technologies, an SRM dealer in Quebec posted the following FAQ:
Q: How much does an SRM (MEV) cost?
A: The cost of an SRM (MEV) unit is approximately $800 plus installation fees.
available at: http://www.allagma.com/products/srmmev-law-in-quebec/frequently-asked-questions-faq/.
The difference in these numbers may have been that the conference announcement did not include the cost
of a Microsoft software license.
20
Sales Data Controller (SDC) is a generic term that applies to a lot of devices in the market that perform a
similar function. They can be stand-alone or integrated into cash register systems. See:
http://www.salesdatacontroller.com/index.php/all-about-sales-data-controller. SDC-Mob is a specific
device made by BMC Inc. It is an SDC that includes secure mobile communications functionality.
21
Tetsuo Yamada, CEO of BMC, indicated that US$350 was the price of a single SDC-Mob (November
16, 2011).
22
The price of the smart card is critical to some people in the states. Thus, a further e-mail conversation
with Dr. Zisky (March 15, 2012) was initiated to confirm this price point. He states:
In my opinion the costs per card in a package of 10,000 pieces is $5 to 7 including all
software packages, license fees and testing/certification fees. The technical solution for
handling this card (readers, drivers, software development) takes … not more than $20.
Based on that we doubled the costs and came to ($ or €) 50. This value is confirmed by
our partners from industry.
23
This, of course, imposes demands on the ECR/POS system, and there may be an upgrade to older
business systems required in a jurisdiction that selects the smart card solution.
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(EJ) not the smart card, but it is “signed” before storage. The smart card holds sums and
counters, not large amounts of basic data.24
Even the data’s signature is not stored on the card. Auditors find the signature in
the EJ, import it into audit software, and then verify authenticity. Thus, the smart card’s
economy is also (in part) its chief liability. Un-encrypted data is stored on an open EJ.
This is a potential security risk, because the EJ can be tampered with. If it is, then the
auditor can detect it, but an audit must be performed to find the tampering.
Quebec’s MEV solves the smart card’s security problem by storing encrypted
data in a tamper-proof external device. The MEV keeps a real-time clock independent of
the ECR/POS system, and provides auditors with a scan-able bar code on each receipt to
verify security.25 The MEV makes system demands on a merchant’s cash register. In
some instances a new cash register is needed, and this can be a considerable expense for
small businesses.26 Although the MEV has additional functionality,27 it is questionable
whether or not its price at fifteen times the cost of an INSIKA smart card returns fifteen
times the security.
BMC’s SDC-Mob provides a third-party solution that matches the capabilities of
the government-involved solutions (INSIKA smart cards and the MEV) at half the price
of an MEV. Transaction data is encrypted. It is signed with an INSIKA-like smart
card.28 Data is securely stored externally. SDC-Mob data can also be accessed remotely
to assure compliance, and a check for tampering can be made without leaving the tax
office. This kind of system appears to be acceptable under the new Belgian regulations,
however if adopted, the smart card will not be INSIKA’s (rather a Belgian card
24

A companion issue concerns the real-time clock, which originates with the ECR/POS system, not the
smart card. The smart card includes output from the real-time clock in its encryption algorithm, but to the
extent a fraudster would want to tamper with the clock he would have access to it in the insecure ECR/POS
system. Changing the clock might be a technique used to confuse an auditor.
25
See: Revenue Quebec, Fight Against Tax Evasion: Sales Recording Module (SRM) (describing the SRM
system) available at: http://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/a-propos/evasion_fiscale/restauration/mev/.
26
Ministry of Revenue Quebec, Fight Against Tax Evasion: Point-of-Sale (POS) Systems, indicates:
As a restaurateur, you are responsible for ensuring that your POS system is SRM [MEV]
compatible and that it can communicate with an SRM [MEV]. To be SRM [MEV]
compatible, your POS system must be adapted by its developer to meet our requirements
and technical specifications. Developers can request that an adapted POS system be
certified compliant with our technical specifications. If the adapted POS system is
compliant, we issue a confirmation of certification that recognizes the compatibility of
the product with an SRM [MEV]. [This page list 81 compatible systems.]
Available at: http://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/a-propos/evasion_fiscale/restauration/produits.aspx. That
this may pose a considerable hardship for some merchants is explained in Anja Karadegllja, Deadline
Looms for Restaurant Rebates, ACTUALITES (February 17, 2011) (which considers how a $2,000 ECR
upgrade in one business and a $6,000 upgrade in another to accommodate the MEV placed these businesses
in considerable financial difficulty, even though Quebec was providing subsidies for merchants), available
at: http://www.lesactualites.ca/?site=CDN&section=page&1=C110216&2=C110119_deadline.
27
The MEV is manufactured by AAEON, a Taiwanese company. The full commercial version with
technical specifications can be seen here: http://www.aaeonsystems.com/products/AEC-6831.php.
28
The SDC-Mob could use the INSIKA smart card, or as in Belgium a different smart card could be
developed locally and used in the device.
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developed by Fedict29 would be required), and the mobile attribute will be eliminated on
political/privacy grounds.30 This approach is similar to the Swedish solution.
From a U.S. perspective, the implementation methodologies of some of these
international solutions create difficulties. The MEV is required in all Quebec restaurants,
and the earlier version of the SDC-Mob (the eTax module)31 is certified for use in a
program that mandates it in all Swedish cash registers. In the U.S. a similar technology
mandate would represent a deep government-intrusion into business privacy/
confidentiality. Proof of a compelling state reason to do so might be needed.32
The German use of INSIKA smart cards in taximeters is a different story. There
is a considerable problem with skimming cash sales by German taxicab operators. Both
the taxicab owners and the revenue authorities are loosing revenue. However, without
requiring smart cards in all taximeters, the city of Hamburg established a voluntary
program with a grant of €5 million for the adoption of taximeters that would be secure
against data manipulation.33 The Hale taximeter company has installed the INSIKA

29

Fedict is a Federal Public Service of Belgium, created on May 11, 2001 as part of the plans to modernize
the federal administration. It is a so-called horizontal Federal Public Service because it isn't responsible for
a specific policy field, but provides services to the other Federal Public Services. Fedict is responsible for
e-Government. See: http://www.fedict.belgium.be/en/
30
As of March 16th, 2012, the Belgian regulations have not been finalized, however they have been
reasonably well developed for some time. They were expected to have been finalized by the end of 2011.
They are the topic of inter-governmental studies, and are considered for example in the Norwegian study
New Regulations for Cash Register Systems (Nytt regelverk for kassasystemer) at 37-39 (in Norwegian,
translation of file with author). They also play a significant role in a Dutch Master’s thesis by M. Leurink,
Beheersmaatregelen ter Voorkoming en Bestrijding van Datamaipulatie in Afrekensystemen (Management
Measures to Prevent and Combat Data Manipulation in Cash) (March 2011) at 36-44 (in Dutch, translation
on file with author) available at: http://www.keurmerkafrekensystemen.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/Beheersmaatregelen_tav_datamanipulatie_afrekensystemen_Leurink_mrt2011.pd
f.
31
Swedish certification (by SWEDAC) was awarded to an earlier version of the SDC-Mob called eTax on
August 24, 2009. Post-2009 development efforts by BMC included working with a smart card (like the
INSIKA card) and the inclusion of remote communications (the Mobile attribute in the SDC-Mob). What
is important in this regard is to notice the responsiveness of the private sector to developments in the
security field. By positioning itself as a standard-setter the Belgian government is pushing the private
sector to adopt and adapt to cutting-edge solutions.
32
See: Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,
96 Georgetown Law Journal 123 (2007) (suggesting that the American law of privacy and “inviolate
personality” differ from the English concept of confidentiality which recognizes and enforces expectations
of trust within relationships, and in this case the concern might be with confidentiality). Daniel J. Solove,
“I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 745
(2007) (arguing that there is a threat to privacy in data mining and other oversight activities even when the
government does not uncover illegal activities).
33
The voluntary Hamburg program can be seen at: http://www.hamburg.de/taxi/3030326/taxameterfoerderung.html. The Hamburg grant is for €1,500 euro per participating taxi.
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smart card and currently offers the only solution on the market.34 The program is
reportedly a success.35
The four New York stings operations that found a high incidence of ECR/POS
system salesmen also selling zappers is a start down the mandatory road, but these stings
do not compare with the 230 litigated cases of restaurants using zappers in Quebec.
Quebec was able to impose the MEV on all restaurants in the province because it had
proof of widespread fraud.36 That is not the case in the U.S., and the states may need to
be looking at a program similar to the German’s voluntary taximeter program.
Non-technology (regulatory) solutions. Jurisdictions that regulate solutions to
zappers have a different focus, and a different proof-point than those that apply
technology – their focus is the ECR/POS system, not the businesses that use them. The
difference is subtle, but the problem is the same. Stated another way:
 A regulatory solution needs to prove that the cash registers in the commercial
marketplace are inherently vulnerable to manipulation. It then regulates
equipment improvements so that the systems will never manipulate transactions.
 A technology solution needs to prove that businesses are exploiting cash register
vulnerabilities. It then monitors use of the equipment in a way that records
manipulations whenever they occur.
Thus, the goal of regulation is to get manufacturers to produce only secure
machines. In this regard, the Dutch and Norwegian approaches to zappers are good
examples of how the regulatory approach works. There are differences in application.
The Dutch persuade manufacturers to improve security; the Norwegians specify
and demand the improvements they want. The underlying premise is the same – there is
a marketplace problem. The premise has a corollary: manufacturers will ultimately
provide the best oversight when (and only when) commercial rewards align with data
security.
Netherlands. Following the discovery of a zapper developer at a manufacturer of
POS systems (2010) the Dutch Tax Administration (Belastingdienst) took the client list
and asked each purchaser of this POS system to sign a statement that declared:
 The type of cash register used
 Whether they used the installed zapper

34

The Hale taximeter system with INSIKA smart card can be seen at:
http://www.hale.at/en/solutions/fiscal-solutions/insika-solution.html.
35
In the 2010-2011 time frame the PTB conducted a voluntary pilot program (up to 10 taxis in Hamburg
and another 10 in Berlin). Within the past six months Dr. Zisky reports that the pilot has recorded 13,000
trips without an error. (Personal e-mail from Dr. Zisky on March 16, 2012, on file with author).
36
Roy Furchgott, With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard To Find, NYT C6 (August 20, 2008) (indicating
that Revenue Quebec had brought 230 zapper cases to court in ten years) available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/technology/30zapper.html?scp=1&sq=With%20Software,%20Till%2
0Tampering%20Is%20Hard%20to%20Find%20%20comments&st=cse
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Whether they were willing to repay lost tax revenue (if any)37
Whether they were willing to take steps to prevent future fiscal damage.

Following up on the related enforcement action the public (with considerable
assistance from the press where this was a big news story) became convinced that the
Belastingdiest could find any non-compliant cash register. Based on these reports, and
the signed statements, which included a promise to prevent future frauds, there very
quickly was a noticeable increase in demand for complaint machines. For this purpose
(and to help the industry meet this need) the Belastingdiest met with over 70 producers
and traders of cash registers. An agreement was reached among all parties (including a
signed letter of intent on April 18, 2011) that resulted in:
 A set of standards for reliable cash registers;38
 A Quality Mark (Het Betrouwbare Afrekensysteem) that would indicate that a
cash register met compliance standards; and
 A commitment by the producers and traders that after July 1, 2013:
o No POS system would be sold that could not achieve a Quality Mark;
o All simple cash registers would have a declaration of settings by the
producer.39
If the Dutch are successful in their cooperative-regulatory approach to zappers,
there will soon be no possibility for technology-assisted sales suppression fraud in the
Netherlands. After July 1, 2013 no cash register system sold in the Netherlands will be
vulnerable to a zapper.
Norway. On February 15, 2012 the Norwegian Ministry of Finance released the
Directorate of Taxation’s report, New Regulations for Cash Register Systems (Nytt
regelverk for kassasystemer),40 and placed it into public consultation until May 15, 2012.
The report essentially recommends that only qualifying cash register systems be
allowed in Norway. Suppliers of cash registers will be required to upgrade current
systems, and make initial and ongoing product declarations to the tax office that the
functional requirements of the regulations are met by their systems. Operators will be
required to acquire new or upgrade current systems and then notify the tax administration
of the change.
Secure electronic records should therefore be Norway’s answer to the
hardware-based security used in foreign countries through control boxes,
smart cards, etc.41
37

“About 85% did not use the zapper module, 15% however did.” Ben G.A.M. van der Zwet,
(Belastindiest computer forensic auditor) A Pebble in the Cash-Economy (draft, on file with author)
38
The standards are produced by an independent Quality Mark authority, Stichting Betrouwbare
Afrekensystemen (Reliable Cash Register Foundation) which can be found at:
http://www.keurmerkafrekensystemen.nl/. Essentially, those standards are classified according to four
management objectives: (1) register all events; (2) integrity of registrations; (3) storage of registrations; and
reports are transparent and reliable.
39
The declaration of settings is specific to each type of simple cash register, but it will describe all system
attributes (no hidden capacities that are not described are allowed). It will lead to a Quality Mark.
40
Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36992076/h_notat_10_4626_HS.pdf (in Norwegian)
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The revenue gain is projected to be substantial.42
The Norwegian view is that product declarations, notifications and fines “… act
as a substitute for a technical solution.”43 The Cash System Act (Kassasystemloven) sets
out the requirements of checkout systems (§3), a duty for suppliers of checkout systems
to assist the tax office with software, programming, and operation of their systems (§4),
requirements for product declarations by suppliers (§5), a set of seven violation fees
imposed on suppliers (§6), and daily “coercive fines” also imposed on suppliers (§7). In
addition, regulations are authorized (§8).44
The cash register system regulations (Kassasystemforskriften) are extensive.
Most notable are the regulations at §2-5 that specify the features that a cash register must
have, and those at §2-6 that specify prohibited features.45 Cash registers that violate
these rules must be “pulled from the market, unless the supplier rectifies the
deficiencies.”46 Enforcing this provision is expected to be relatively easy as the supplier
and user will register each cash system (by government issued ID) in an online
database.47
Fourteen additional fines and fees are specified in the Bookkeeping Regulations
(Bokforingsforskriften) that deal with the operator’s use of the cash register system.48
The U.S. Way Forward
It is certain that the U.S. states are listening and learning from the experiences of
the international community in the battle against technology-assisted sales suppression.
At the moment at least nineteen states are engaged in some form of legislative or
administrative enforcement actions today.
Admittedly, there is very little to show for this effort if we are using litigation as
our yardstick. As of March 15, 2012 there is no public evidence that any state has
initiated an audit on a firm that has used a zapper or phantom-ware to skim sales. All
state cases are those where the state is following a federal income tax audit.
However, we may well be on the cusp of change in the U.S. Preparations for
enforcement action are underway. Laws that penalize the sale, purchase, installation,
41

Id., at 60.
An independent IT consulting firm indicated that adoption of these rules would provide an estimate net
present value gain of 14.092 billion NOK or $2.48 billion USD over ten years. Steria AS,
Skattedirektoratet: Prosjekt “Nytt regelverk for kassasystemer” – Samfunnsokonomisk analyse (Tax
Directorate: Project "New regulations for checkout systems" - Social Economic Analysis) (September 21,
2011) at 28, Table 5, available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/36992076/vedlegg_steria.pdf (in
Norwegian).
43
Nytt regelverk for kassasystemer, supra note 40, at 62.
44
Id., 97-98.
45
Id., at 99-100.
46
Id., at 63.
47
Id., at 63.
48
Id., at 67 & 104.
42
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transfer, or possession of any automated sales suppression device, zapper or phantomware have been enacted in one state (Georgia) and passed by the legislature in three
others (Utah, West Virginia and Maine). Four highly productive stings have been
conducted in New York.
Next steps in the U.S. This is the most interesting compliance question. What
enforcement direction will the states move in, as suppression frauds are uncovered? Will
a technology solution like the INSIKA smart card, the Quebec MEV or BMC’s SDCMob be the route, or will a regulatory approach be used? If the later, will the states try to
persuade cash register providers to comply with industry formulated rules like the Dutch,
or will they mandate that providers make changes (and the users adhere to them) like the
Norwegians?
Will any of these solutions work in the U.S. if they are applied universally
throughout a jurisdiction (as in Sweden, or Norway), or throughout a discrete business
sector, like the restaurant sector (as in Quebec and Belgium)?
A privacy push-back. The most interesting legal question deals with privacy.
How will state tax administrations respond to a “business privacy” push-back?
Privacy concerns may move enforcement into more surgical responses than we
have seen internationally (outside of the German use of the INSIKA smart card in
taximeters). States may adopt the adage that “every dog deserves one bite,” and give the
Commissioner authority to mandate one of the international solutions case-by-case, and
only in certain defined situations. Perhaps the rule would isolate businesses that have
been shown to be regularly out of compliance with the sales tax, or with historically bad
records, or with especially contentious audit positions. Maybe the rule would be even
narrower and apply only to businesses that have been found to be using a zapper or
phantom-ware applications.
In these instances a businesses might be required by the Commissioner to install a
technology solution like the SDC-Mob, which can be remotely overseen by tax
authorities. Or perhaps a Norwegian approach might be authorized, and regulations
could be drafted that would force problematical businesses to install cash register systems
that are manufactured with security features like those required in Norway. Such an
approach would be more lenient than simply revoking the sales tax permit, as Oklahoma
is prepared to do.
Not Just Cash – Debit/Credit Transaction Too
One final point needs to be made. Technology-assisted sales suppression is no
longer just about cash skimming; this fraud has migrated to debit/credit card
transactions. There are two indications that this is happening, and that zappers are key
instruments in facilitating it, one from Norway, and the other from the recent Fiscalis
meeting in Ireland.
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Norway. The recent Norwegian regulatory proposals include a discussion of
“problems related to the terminal – use of an independent terminal.” In short the problem
involves debit/credit card terminals that are not connected to the cash register system. If
the terminal is programmed to remit funds to a different (personal) account at a different
bank (not the bank used by the business making the sale), then a sale can be rung up “as
if” it was a cash sale and then zapped as follows:
1. The cashier scans the purchase;
2. The cash register indicates a sales total ($500, for example);
3. The credit/debit card is swiped for $500;
4. An authorization is received from the debit/credit card intermediary;
5. The cashier then presses “cash sale,” (not credit/debit card sale) a receipt
is issued, and the transaction completed;
6. Later that evening the false cash sale is “zapped” from the system.
Neither the debit/credit card transaction (at 3 & 4), nor the sales transaction (at 6)
is recorded in the cash register system. There is no digital trace for a traditional auditor
to follow to determine liability, unless the auditor knows the credit/debit card that was
used, and traces the payment from the cardholder’s bank to the (personal) account of the
business owner.
The Norwegian regulations solve this problem by requiring debit/credit card
terminals to be tied to the cash register.49
Irish Fiscalis meeting. How significant is this permutation of sales suppression?
Significant enough so that nearly a full day of meetings at the E.U. Fiscalis held in
Dublin, Ireland (October 19-21, 2011) were devoted to this problem with reports filed on
the problem by the UK50 and Portugal,51 followed by workshops focused on combating
this fraud.
The U.S. states need to take this permutation of sales suppression fraud into
account as they devise their way forward. The international community is already doing
so. This mutation appears to be significant.

49

Checkout System Regulations (Kassasystemforskriften) § 2-5, second paragraph; § 2-8-3 and § 2-8-2(g);
Bookkeeping Regulations (Bokforingsforskriften) § 5a-2, second paragraph; § 5a-14, third paragraph.
50
Chas Coysh, HMRC Indirect Tax Team, Strategic Risk Unit, Large Business Services. His Friday,
October 21, 2011 presentation focused on Merchant Acquirer Accounts – Tax Evasion in the U.K.
51
Ana Isabel Silva Mascarenhas, the e-Audit Contact Person for the Portuguese Tax Administration, who
presented on fraud with Merchant Acquirer Accounts in Portugal.
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